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Abstract
This paper synthesizes and extends the literature on the taxation of foreign source income in a
framework that covers both green…eld and acquisition investment, and a general constraint linking
investment at home and abroad for the multinational by introducing a cost of adjustment for the
mobile factor. Unless the cost of adjustment is zero, the domestic tax on foreign-source income
should always be set to ensure the optimal allocation of the mobile factor between domestic and
foreign assets and should follow the classical rules in the literature; national optimality requires
the deduction rule, and global optimality requires the credit rule. Only in the zero-cost case does
exemption become optimal. Allowances can be set so as to ensure that domestic and foreign asset
purchases are undistorted by the tax system: this requires a cash-‡ow tax on domestic investment in
the green…eld case, and a cross-border cash ‡ow tax on foreign investment in both cases. These basic
results extend to various extensions of the model, notably (i) when a pro…t-shifting motive is present;
(ii) to some extent, when a corporate income tax is in place. The introduction of tax administration
costs into the model can explain the empirical trend towards use of the exemption regime.
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1 Introduction
For many years tax policy in the US as well as the UK seemed at least partly to follow the logic of
conventional international tax theory by taxing foreign source income according to the tax credit system,
although both limited the size of the tax credit. Other countries like Germany and France, however, chose
to exempt foreign source income fully or almost fully from domestic taxation. But in one of the most
striking trends in corporate taxation in recent years, there has been a signi…cant switch to exempting
foreign-source income from taxation. According to PwC Worldwide Tax Summaries, out of 37 high-
income countries, 19 had an exemption system in 1998, rising to 27 in 20081 . None of these 37 countries
switched from exemption to a credit or other system during this period.
This trend appears to con‡ict with classical results in the theory of international taxation, which states
that countries should tax the foreign source income of multinational …rms according to the foreign tax
credit system to make sure that the allocation of capital in the world economy is undistorted (Richman,
1963). This result is based on the idea that, under the foreign tax credit system, …rms will ultimately
pay the same tax, irrespective of the investment location, so that their location choices are not distorted
if corporate tax rates di¤er across countries,2 achieving so-called capital export neutrality (CEN).
However, the "old" view that the exemption system is inferior to the tax credit system has been
challenged by Desai and Hines (2003, 2004). Their main argument is that a large part of international
investment nowadays takes the form of mergers and acquisitions, a type of investment largely neglected
by the "old" view. They emphasize the fact that mergers and acquisitions investment, implies a change
in ownership, rather than the location of physical capital. But the ownership of assets is distorted if
di¤erent potential owners, who are located in di¤erent countries, are taxed di¤erently. Desai and Hines
argue that capital ownership neutrality (CON) requires that all potential owners of an asset face the
same tax burden, irrespective of their country of residence, and that this requires an exemption form tax
of foreign source income.3
Becker and Fuest (2010) extend and re…ne Desai and Hines’ argument by observing that once a
multinational has made an acquisition, it also faces the problem of how to allocate a scarce resource
between the existing company and the new acquisition. They consider two polar cases. They …nd that
the exemption system is optimal from a national as well as a global perspective if foreign acquisitions
of multinational …rms do not a¤ect domestic activities. But they argue that in the opposite polar case,
when the number of acquisitions abroad reduces the number at home one-for-one, exemption is no longer
optimal: it leads to overinvestment in the low tax country and underinvestment in the high tax country.
Moreover, in this case, neither the tax credit system nor the full taxation after deduction system can
restore global or national optimality4 .
There is no doubt that the "new view" of taxation of foreign-source income in an environment in
which FDI takes the form of acquisitions is an important step forward. But existing papers are based
on rather di¤erent assumptions regarding the corporate tax system under consideration, the impact of
1 We thank Johannes Voget for providing us with this data-set.
2 A second key result in the theory of international taxation states that, from a national perspective, it is optimal to tax
foreign source income according to the full taxation after deduction principle (Feldstein and Hartman, 1979). However, this
leads to a suboptimal outcome from a global point of view.
3 The term capital ownership neutrality was introduced by Devereux (1990) in a slightly di¤erent context.
4 Becker and Fuest (2010) show that national optimality can be achieved in this case by allowing the …rm to deduct the
cost of the acquisation against tax in the …rst period, and then applying the deduction rule to foreign-source income in the
second period. This result is a special case of our Proposition 2 below.
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foreign investment on domestic economic activity and the type of foreign investment - green…eld versus
acquisitions. This makes it di¢cult to draw systematic conclusions for purposes of tax policy. This paper
attempts to reconcile and extend the di¤erent results and approaches in the literature by analyzing the
optimality of taxes on foreign source income in a model which encompasses most of the models in the
literature, both "new" and "old".
Our model extends the literature in several ways. Firstly, existing models usually take the tax base as
given and focus on tax rates. Instead, we consider the design of tax rates and tax bases simultaneously,
and we show that this is of key importance for understanding the optimal taxation of foreign source
income. Secondly, we develop a model which includes both green…eld and acquisition investment as
special cases. Thirdly, rather than assuming that foreign investment either reduces domestic investment
one-for-one or does not a¤ect domestic investment at all, our approach also includes intermediate cases,
as is explained further below.
In our model, foreign investment by a domestic multinational …rm is in two steps. The …rst is the
purchase of an immobile asset in the foreign country, initially owned by a foreign household, and can
be understood as choosing the location of production. This asset may be interpreted as a piece of land
or an existing …rm. Following Desai and Hines (2003) and Becker and Fuest (2010), we allow for the
multinational to have an ownership advantage relative to the seller i.e. it can produce more output from
the asset.5 Conceptually, the only di¤erence between green…eld and acquisition investment is that the
foreign corporate tax rate is capitalized into the price of the …rm, but not into the green…eld asset. This
brings out the central role of tax capitalization very clearly, in contrast to other models, where green…eld
investment is often viewed as the allocation of capital to a production function. Of course, there may be
other di¤erences between green…eld and acquisition investment - in particular, they may create di¤erent
spillovers for the host country, and we consider this extension in Section 5.3.
The second step is to combine the immobile asset with a continuously variable, internationally mobile,
factor of production, and can be understood as choosing the scale of production. The recent literature
on the taxation of foreign pro…ts has shown that it is of central importance whether foreign investment
a¤ects domestic economic activity, and we allow for this in a simple and empirically relevant way, by
means of introducing a cost of adjustment for the mobile factor. Speci…cally, the multinational has an
initial stock of the mobile factor, which it can allocate to assets at home or abroad. But, in addition, it
can hire additional amounts of the mobile factor, at the cost of incurring a convex cost of adjustment in
addition to the market price of the factor. In the limiting case where this cost of adjustment is zero, there
is no link between domestic and foreign production (Becker and Fuest’s "variable management capacity").
In the other limiting case where the adjustment cost becomes very large, there is a one-to-one trade-o¤
between domestic and foreign projects (Becker and Fuest’s "…xed management capacity").
We …rst consider the case where governments can choose the tax rate and the tax base, including the
size of the initial allowance. This brings out the main features very clearly. In the general case where
there is some positive cost of adjustment of the mobile factor, our main …ndings are as follows. The
government has two kinds of instrument; the statutory tax rate on foreign-source income, and allowances
on domestic and foreign asset purchase. It turns out that for both national and global optimality, there is
a simple and robust assignment of instruments to targets. First, the domestic tax rate on foreign-source
5 We follow these contributions in abstracting from residence based taxes on capital income at the personal level. In the
context of taxing foreign source income the role of these taxes is discussed in Becker and Fuest (2011), Devereux (2000,
2004), Gordon (2011), Ruf (2009) and Wilson (2011).
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income should be set to ensure the optimal allocation of the mobile factor between domestic and foreign
assets. The setting of the tax rate follows the classical rules in the literature; national optimality requires
the deduction rule, and global optimality requires the credit rule. Second, the initial allowances should
be set so as to ensure that domestic and foreign asset purchases are undistorted by the tax system. This
requires a cash-‡ow tax on domestic investment6 , and a cross-border cash ‡ow tax on foreign investment.7
Implementation of a cash ‡ow tax on domestic or outbound ‡ows is relatively straightforward: in
either case all real expenditure would be deductible from the tax base, and the corresponding income
would be taxed at the same rate. However, there is a di¤erence in the required tax rate. For national
optimality, the deduction rule implies that the cross-border cash ‡ow tax should be set at the same rate
as the domestic tax. But global optimality requires the rate of the cross-border cash ‡ow tax to depend
on the tax rate of the foreign country - that is, on the destination of the outbound investment. In practice
this would give an incentive for …rms to route investment through a high tax country, and governments
would need anti-avoidance rules to prevent this.
It may be objected that our model, taken literally, predicts that all countries should choose something
other than an exemption regime; that is, that they should levy some positive tax on foreign source income.
A …rst explanation of why we instead see a trend towards exemption systems, which we address in Section
4.4, is the cost of tax administration; it seems reasonable to suppose that an exemption system has a
lower cost of administration. If the cost of moving skilled labour or capital between di¤erent subsidiaries
of a multinational is also falling over time, our model predicts that the e¢ciency loss from choosing
exemption would also fall, explaining an increasing use of the exemption system.
A second possible explanation for the increasing use of exemption systems is that parent companies
of multinational corporations may …nd it possible to move their residence for tax purposes (although
they may face a tax charge in doing so). We do not address the incentive to switch the location of the
parent company, although our model could be extended in this direction. With this additional feature, it
is intuitively clear that the greater the mobility of the parent, the lower would be the optimal tax rate on
foreign source income. Further, if this mobility is increasing over time, then this could also help explain
the trend towards exemption.
Our analysis includes a number of extensions of the baseline model. Here, we mention two of the
most important ones. First, we show that our results also hold in a variant of our model where the
multinational can engage in pro…t shifting by manipulating transfer prices. It turns out that the credit
rule does double duty in this case: it ensures globally e¢cient allocation of managerial capacity, and
eliminates incentives for transfer-pricing8 . This result holds whether or not the costs of transfer-pricing
(for example, tax advice) are deductible from the corporate tax.
Second, we analyze the case where the tax base is the full income of the …rm, after depreciation but
before …nancing costs. If depreciation costs and …nancing costs for both debt and equity were allowed
against tax, as under the ACE (allowance for corporate equity), then the tax would be equivalent in
present value terms to a cash ‡ow tax. In modelling an income tax we therefore do not allow …nancing
costs to be deductible. This removes one instrument available to the government, and generally means
that a …rst-best solution is no longer feasible. In this setting, we consider a second best setting of the
6 A quali…cation is that in the aquisitions case, no allowance should be granted as the aquisition price is already adjusted
by the corporate tax rate.
7 This was …rst pointed out by Keen (1993).
8 Under a weak additional assumption, the deduction rule also induces nationally optimal transfer pricing for the host
country of the multinational.
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tax rate on foreign source income, and show that the second-best globally optimal tax rate depends on
(i) whether or not the home statutory rate is greater or lower than the foreign rate, and (ii) the relative
sensitivity of the cost of domestic and foreign investment to the tax rate. In particular, the credit system
does not always dominate the exemption system, but it does so when sensitivities are the same and the
foreign statutory rate is higher than the domestic rate.
Other extensions are as follows. First, while our baseline model assumes that the interest rate in the
capital market is given, we analyze how our results are a¤ected if we close the model and endogenize
the interest rate. Our results for global optimality do not change. In the case of national optimality,
however, countries may have an incentive to change the interest rate, depending on whether they are
capital exporters or capital importers, so that the nationally optimal tax policy may be distorted. Second,
we explore the impact of taxing foreign source income only when it is repatriated to the home country.
In line with the "new view" of dividends, we show that the investment from earnings retained abroad
does not depend on the home country taxation of foreign source income. Third, we examine the case of
competition amongst acquirers, which allows the owners of the target company to capture part of the
surplus generated by an acquisition. Again we show that our results are una¤ected. Fourth, we allow for
positive spillovers of activity by the multinational company in the foreign country. This does not a¤ect
national optimality for the home country, since the spillovers accrue to foreign residents. We show that
global optimality requires a modi…cation of the cross-border cash ‡ow tax, with higher allowances being
required to promote additional outbound investment.
The rest of the paper is set up as follows. Section 2 brie‡y discusses the previous literature. Section
3 presents the model. In section 4 we analyze the optimal taxation on foreign source income for the
di¤erent variants of our model. Section 5 explores our various extensions of the baseline model. Section
6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
We organize the discussion by …rst focussing on the polar case of unlimited management capacity. Desai
and Hines (2003, p. 496) for the most part assume that domestic capital stock is una¤ected by foreign
acquisitions, corresponding to our special case of unlimited management capacity9 . In this case, they
have three claims. First, they claim that national optimality requires exemption: ’National welfare is
maximized by exempting foreign income from taxation in cases in which additional foreign investment does
not reduce domestic tax revenue raised from domestic economic activity.’ (Desai and Hines, 2003, p. 496).
Second, they claim that exemption is also su¢cient for global optimality, i.e. CON: "CON is satis…ed if
all countries exempt foreign income from taxation" (Desai and Hines, 2003, p. 494). Third, they say that
exemption is not necessary for CON, as a tax credit system will also work: "if all countries tax foreign
income (possibly at di¤erent rates), while permitting taxpayers to claim foreign tax credits, ..(this meets)..
the requirements for CON" (Desai and Hines, 2003, p. 494). Turning to Becker and Fuest (2010), in the
case of unlimited management capacity, they …nd that the exemption system is optimal from a national as
well as a global perspective if foreign acquisitions of multinational …rms do not a¤ect domestic activities
(Proposition 3 in their paper). Our results for unlimited management capacity generalize and clarify
9 Speci…cally, they assume that "the total stock of physical capital in each country is una¤ected by international tax
rules" (p494).
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these claims: we show that with a cash-‡ow tax, any tax on foreign-source income is optimal from a
global perspective, not just a tax of zero (exemption) or a tax equal to the di¤erence between domestic
and foreign corporate tax rates (credit).
Desai and Hines have relatively little to say about nationally and globally optimal tax rules when
national capital stocks respond to tax di¤erences: in this case, they say that "the welfare implications of
CON are less decisive" (Desai and Hines, 2003, p. 494). Becker and Fuest (2010) consider the polar case
where foreign acquisitions reduce domestic investment one-for-one. They also consider a cross border
cash ‡ow system, as we do, and …nd that this system leads to national but not to global optimality. We
…nd that a cross-border cash ‡ow system also generates global optimality; the di¤erence between the two
results is explained by the fact that Becker and Fuest (2010) impose the condition that the tax rate of
the cross border cash ‡ow tax has to be the same as the domestic corporate income tax.
Our main contribution in this paper, relative to the literature, however, is to characterize optimal
tax rules in the general case where management capacity is limited, but not …xed. In this case, we show
that the optimality of the exemption rule is not robust; national and global optimality of exemption only
holds in the knife edge case where the impact of foreign investment on domestic activity is exactly zero.
As soon as there is a small but positive adjustment cost, deduction is nationally optimal, and credit is
globally optimal.
Another related paper is Wilson (2011). In his model foreign acquisitions may increase or decrease
the productivity of domestic activities of multinational …rms. While his model di¤ers from ours in various
respects, one important di¤erence is that foreign taxes are always deductible from taxable foreign source
income. We do not make this assumption.10 Given this, he asks whether domestic taxes should be
positive. His main result is that exemption is usually not optimal.
Another insight generated by our analysis is that many results for the optimal taxation of foreign
pro…ts in the presence of acquisitions investment that have been derived in the literature are driven
by assumptions on the tax base, rather than underlying factors like di¤erences between acquisitions and
green…eld investment or the impact of foreign investment on domestic investment as such. In an extension
of our baseline model, we show this by assuming that the tax base is as in a typical income tax system,
where tax depreciation is equivalent to economic depreciation and no relief is given for the cost of …nance.
In general in this setting, it is not possible to achieve the …rst best, since the tax drives up the cost of
capital leading to underinvestment. The optimal treatment of the mobile factor depends on whether the
costs of using that factor are fully deductible from tax. If so, then the usual rules apply to the tax rate:
national optimality requires a deduction system, and global optimality requires a credit system. If not,
then these rules apply not to the tax rate, but to the rate of relief given, since this is what determines
the international allocation of this factor.
3 The Model
3.1 Overview
There are two countries, home and foreign, and two periods. A single multinational corporation (MNC)
is based in the home country. In the …rst period, the MNC can purchase assets either in the home or
10 Gordon (2011) also analyses optimal taxes on foreign source income but focuses on income shifting between corporate
pro…ts and wages of employees.
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foreign country. An asset can be either a green…eld site or an existing company, as explained in more
detail below. Output can be produced by combining this asset with a factor of production, which we call
management capacity, following Becker and Fuest (2010), but which could be interpreted as capital. This
factor can be purchased on an international market at a …xed price  Each asset requires one unit of
management capacity, plus one unit of local labour, to produce output in the second period. The MNC
has a …xed initial stock of management capacity, 0 which can be costlessly allocated between home
and foreign activities. In addition, the MNC can hire  ¤ additional managers on the international
market to work at home or in the foreign country respectively. Hiring  however, incurs convex costs
of adjustment, (). This nests the two special cases that have so far been considered in the literature.
Speci…cally,  ´ 0 is the case of completely variable management capacity, and  ! 1 is the case of
completely …xed management capacity. The adjustment cost function is discussed in more detail below.
3.2 Assets and Outputs
In the case of green…eld investment, we assume that there are number - technically, a continuum - of
di¤erent possible domestic and foreign investment projects, indexed by ¢ ¢¤ 2 [0 1] respectively.11
In the case of green…eld investment, ¢ ¢¤ are the outputs from the domestic and foreign projects
respectively. In the case of acquisition investment, we assume that the initial owner of the asset - a home
or foreign …rm - can produce  ¤ respectively using one unit of management Following Becker and Fuest,
as well as much existing literature on MNCs, we assume that the MNC has some comparative advantage
in management, or other …xed factor, so that when a national domestic (foreign) …rm is acquired by the
MNC, its output is boosted by ¢ (resp. ¢¤) So, when owned by the MNC, revenues from the domestic
and foreign …rms are  + ¢ ¤ + ¢¤ respectively
3.3 Asset Prices
Generally, we denote the price of the domestic and foreign assets by ¤ respectively; this is the price
paid by the MNC in the …rst period if the asset is bought. In the case of green…eld investment, we assume
that the MNC can acquire the asset (e.g. land) at its opportunity cost. This cost can be interpreted as
what can be produced from the land in its alternative use e.g. farming, and we denote the costs as ¤
in the home and foreign countries respectively. So, in this case,
 =   ¤ = ¤ (1)
We make a similar assumption in the case of acquisition investment i.e. that the MNC can acquire the
foreign target at its private opportunity cost, which in this case is the after-tax pro…t which the target
…rm could have made, which is ( ¡ )(1 ¡ ) for the home target, and (¤ ¡)(1 ¡ ¤) for the foreign
target. This assumption is relaxed in Section 4.1 below. So, in this case,
 = ( ¡)(1 ¡ )(1 + ) ¤ = (¤ ¡)(1 ¡ ¤)(1 + ) (2)
11 An interesting question for tax purposes is whether pro…ts generated by a foreign investment project are based on
domestic assets of the multinational …rm like particular know-how, for instance. If so, one could argue that royalties should
be paid to the parent company, to make sure that the income generated by domestic assets is also taxed domestically. In
the following we abstract from this issue. Including it would require a broader discussion of international income shifting,
which is not the focus of this paper.
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Note the key di¤erence between green…eld and acquisition assets; in the latter, the corporate tax is
capitalized into the price, whereas in the former, it is not12 . In our framework, this is the only substantive
di¤erence between green…eld and acquisition investment, and it is this that drives the di¤erences in the
results below13 . Finally, note that if the revenue or pro…t produced from land in its alternative use
is subject to corporate tax, then  = (1 ¡ ) ¤ = ¤(1 ¡ ) and there would be no substantive
di¤erence between green…eld and acquisition investment.
3.4 The Multinational
With either green…eld or acquisition investment, the MNC will purchase a domestic asset if and only if
the productivity of the asset is above some cuto¤ ¢^ Similarly, the MNC will purchase a foreign asset
if and only if the productivity of the asset is above some cuto¤ ¢^¤ The number of managers required
to run domestic operations is therefore 1 ¡ ¢^ and similarly, the number of managers required to run
foreign operations is 1 ¡ ¢^¤ The number of new hires that the MNC makes in its domestic and foreign
operations is then
 = 1 ¡ ¢^ ¡ (0 ¡¤) ¤ = 1 ¡ ¢^¤ ¡¤ (3)
where ¤ is the number of its 0 existing managers the MNC costlessly allocates to its foreign subsidiary.
Of course,  ¤ can negative, in which case they have the interpretation of reductions in the initial
managerial workforce.
Following a well-known literature in labour economics (Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996), we suppose
that there are costs () ¤(¤) of adjusting the managerial workforce. For  ¤  0 these will be the
costs of hiring and training. For  ¤  0 these will be the legal and organizational costs of reducing
the existing workforce. We consider two possible cases. The …rst is the limiting case of no adjustment
costs i.e. the following assumption holds:
NC: () ´ ¤(¤) ´ 0.
The second is where adjustment costs are positive, in which case, we assume standard regularity
conditions on adjustment costs; namely, the adjustment cost function is twice continuously di¤erentiable,
strictly convex, and strictly increasing in  ¤ :
C: 0() ¤0(¤)  0  ¤ 6= 0 00() ¤00(¤)  0 0(0) ¤0(0) = 0
These conditions are satis…ed, for example, by the quadratic adjustment cost functions 2
2 
¤
2 (
¤)2  ¤ 
0 We also assume that along with wages, these costs are fully deductible from the tax base.
Given the above, second-period domestic and foreign cash-‡ows of the …rm are
¦ =
Z 1
¢^
( + ¢ ¡)¢ ¡ () (4)
¦¤ =
Z 1
¢^¤
(¤ + ¢¤ ¡)¢¤ ¡ ¤(¤)
12 Sha…k et al. (2011) study the impact of taxation on foreign acquisitions of German multinational companies and …nd
evidence that host country taxes are partly capitalised in the purchase price.
13 It is of course, possible that the land purchased by a multinational is already utilized in a taxable activity, in which
case, even this di¤erence disappears.
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where, in the case of green…eld investment, it is understood that  = ¤ = 0
Second period cash-‡ow ¦ is taxed at rate  by the home government. Second period cash-‡ow ¦¤ is
taxed at rate ¤ by the foreign government and at rate  by the home government.
We do not explicitly permit a deduction for the cost of …nance or depreciation in the second period.
Instead we model …rst period allowances as proportional to the asset purchase prices. These allowances
can be interpreted as the present value of deductions for interest and depreciation arising in either period.
Below we consider in particular a cash ‡ow tax in which the value of the allowance is equal to the tax rate.
As is well known, this can be achieved by a cash ‡ow tax which allows a deduction in the …rst period for
the entire cost of asset purchases, but no deduction for the cost of …nance. However, the allowances could
also be interpreted as relief for true economic depreciation as well as the cost of …nance. For simplicity
our discussion is based on the cash ‡ow approach, where …nance is raised from new equity, given by:
 = (1 ¡ ¢^)(1 ¡ ) + (1 ¡ ¢^¤)(1 ¡  ¡ ¤)¤ (5)
where   are the shares of the purchase prices  ¤ respectively that can be set against domestic
corporate tax, and ¤ is the share of the purchase price  ¤ that can be set against foreign corporate tax.
The MNC makes three choices; it chooses ¢^ ¢^¤¤
3.5 Relationship to the Existing Literature
This set-up encompasses most existing contributions to the study of rules for taxation of foreign-source
income. First, the original Feldstein-Hartman(1979) set-up can be thought of as a special case where
(i) there are no asset purchase decisions i.e. the MNC has already decided on the number of plants at
home and abroad i.e. ¢^, and ¢^¤; (ii) the only decision is now to allocate a …xed stock of the factor of
production (capital in their model) between the domestic and foreign plants. In turn, the case of a …xed
stock of capital is a limiting case of this set-up where the cost of adjustments to the capital stock become
in…nite i.e.  ¤ ! 1 The model of Becker and Fuest (2010) is also a special case of this one, where (i)
investment can only be acquisition, not green…eld, and (ii) the variable factor of production (management
capacity in their case) is either completely …xed or completely variable i.e. either assumption NC holds,
or assumption C holds, with  ¤ ! 1.
There are many extensions of Feldstein-Hartman (1979) set-up, but most of these share the common
feature that they do not explicitly model asset acquisition across borders. Investment decisions are
(implicitly) made by households, who rent or sell capital to domestic …rms who are already established
in each country: there are no multi-nationals. For example, Horst (1980) allows the supply of capital
(assumed …xed in both countries in Feldstein-Hartman (1979)) to be elastic. Keen and Piekkola (1997)
extend the Horst framework to allow for a government budget constraint, and also allow home and foreign
governments to set domestic distorting taxes and also lump-sum taxes. Slemrod et al.(1997) study an
extension of Feldstein-Hartman (1979) where there is both inward and outward investment, and Devereux
(2004) extends this to the case of simultaneous portfolio and direct investment ‡ows. Some of the ground
covered by these papers is also covered in our extensions: for example, in Section 5.3.1, we study the case
where the supply of both capital and managerial capacity is endogenous.
Other related literature includes recent contributions on the taxation of outward investment where
multinationals are modelled, and which consider the choice between FDI and exports as modes of serving
the foreign market. Devereux and Hubbard (2003), which studies an environment where the home …rm
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competes in the foreign market with a competitor …rm located in a third country. For the …rm, there
is no link between domestic production and either export or FDI, as in this paper, in the language of
Becker and Fuest (2010), there is unlimited management capacity. Devereux and Hubbard (2003) and
Becker (2013) also study tax rules where …rms can choose between exports and FDI. Our results would
also apply (suitably modi…ed) to these models.
There is a small empirical literature investigating how foreign investment of multinational …rms a¤ects
their activity at home or in other locations. While Desai et al (2005) …nd for a panel of US multinationals
that more foreign investment goes along with an expansion of domestic activities, Belderbos et. al
(2013), using a dataset of Japanese multinationals, …nd a negative relationship between activities in
di¤erent locations, con…rming the results of Stevens and Lipsey (1992) for US data. Herzer and Schrooten
(2008) …nd a positive relationship for US data, con…rming the …ndings in Desai et al (2005), and a
negative relationship in data for German multinational …rms. Thus, regarding the question of whether
the assumptions of …xed or ‡exible supply of the variable factor in our model are more relevant, the
empirical literature is divided.
4 Analysis
4.1 The Firm
The …rm maximizes the value of second-period after-tax cash-‡ow minus new equity, i.e.
~ = ¡ + (1 ¡ )¦ + (1 ¡ 
¤ ¡  )¦¤
1 + 
(6)
where  is taken as exogenous e.g. determined on the world market (we relax this in an extension below).
So, using (4),(5) and(6), the maximand of the …rm can be written out explicitly as
 = ¡(1 ¡ ¢^)(1 + )(1 ¡ ) ¡ (1 ¡ ¢^¤)(1 + )(1 ¡  ¡ ¤)¤ (7)
+(1 ¡ )
·Z 1
¢^
( + ¢ ¡)¢ ¡ 
³
1 ¡ ¢^ ¡ ( ¡¤)
´¸
+(1 ¡ ¤ ¡  )
·Z 1
¢^¤
(¤ + ¢¤ ¡)¢¤ ¡ ¤(1 ¡ ¢^¤ ¡¤)
¸
where  = ~ (1 + )The …rm’s choice variables are ¢^ ¢^¤ 2 [0 1] and ¤ 2 [00] Throughout, we
assume interior solutions; it is a straightforward exercise to show that Propositions 1-4 below extend to
the case of corner solutions. Then, the …rm’s …rst-order conditions with respect to ¢^ ¢^¤ characterize
the acquisition decisions of the …rm and can be written as:
 + ¢^ ¡ ¡ 0()

=
(1 ¡ )
(1 ¡ )(1 + ) (8)
¤ + ¢^¤ ¡ ¡ ¤0(¤)
 ¤
=
(1 ¡ ¤ ¡  )
(1 ¡ ¤ ¡  ) (1 + ) (9)
These can be interpreted as standard conditions for investment at home and abroad. The LHS of each
expression is the marginal product of the investment. The RHS is a standard expression for the cost of
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capital. These are equalized at the optimal level of investment. The RHS of the condition for outbound
investment re‡ects the tax due in both countries.
The …rm’s …rst-order condition with respect to ¤ characterizes the decision of the …rm about where
to allocate initial management capacity, and is:
¤0(¤)(1 ¡ ¤ ¡  ) = 0()(1 ¡ ) (10)
This says that the marginal cost of adjusting management numbers for the MNC is the same in the
domestic and foreign country.
4.2 National Optimality
4.2.1 Green…eld Investment
We begin with the green…eld case. We treat the interest rate  and the wage  are independent of
both the MNC’s decisions and choice of tax system. Given this, national economic welfare can then be
measured by just the value of the …rm plus domestic tax revenue. (When   are not exogenous, this
is not the case - see Section 5.2 below). An expression for this can be obtained from (7) by setting
 =  =  =  = 0 (this adds in net tax revenue) and also specializing to the green…eld case by setting
 = ¤ = 0,  =  and  ¤ = ¤. Doing this gives
 = ¡(1 ¡ ¢)(1 + ) ¡ (1 ¡ ¢¤)(1 + )¤(1 ¡ ¤) (11)
+
Z 1
¢^
(¢ ¡)¢ ¡ () + (1 ¡ ¤)
·Z 1
¢^¤
(¢¤ ¡)¢¤ ¡ ¤(¤)
¸
Note that from the perspective of national welfare the bene…t of the foreign purchase is reduced by the
tax ¤ but at the same time, the cost of the foreign purchase is reduced by the foreign tax allowances at
rate ¤. The …rst-order condition for a maximum of (11) with respect to ¢^ ¢^¤ ¤ can be written as:
¢^ ¡ ¡ 0()

= 1 +  (12)
¢^¤ ¡ ¡ ¤0(¤)
¤
=
(1 ¡ ¤)
(1 ¡ ¤)(1 + ) (13)
¤0(¤)(1 ¡ ¤) = 0() (14)
These compare to the …rms’ conditions (8),(9),(10). The tax system is said to be nationally optimal if
the …rm’s choice of ¢^ ¢^¤ ¤ also maximizes 
The conditions for this are as follows. First, comparing (10) and (14), we see that if assumption C
holds, for nationally optimal allocation of ¤ we need
(1 ¡ ¤) = (1 ¡ 
¤ ¡  )
1 ¡  ) 
 = (1 ¡ ¤) (15)
i.e. the deduction rule. On the other hand, if NC holds choice of ¤ is undetermined, and so no
restriction is as yet imposed on  
Second, consider investments. Comparing (8) and (12) for domestic investment with  = 0 and  = 
implies that national optimality requires
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 =  (16)
This is a standard result requiring a cash ‡ow taxation or its equivalent for domestic investment, at any
rate of tax for 0 ·  · 1. It is well known that such a tax leaves the cost of capital una¤ected, and
therefore neutral with respect to standard investment decisions. This result is independent of the size of
adjustment costs. Comparing (9) and (13) for outbound investment, national optimality of investment
requires
(1 ¡  ¡ ¤)
(1 ¡ ¤ ¡  ) =
(1 ¡ ¤)
(1 ¡ ¤) (17)
which implies
 = (1 ¡ ¤)  = (1 ¡ ¤) 0 ·  · 1 (18)
This implies that the home country should levy a cash ‡ow tax at any rate  on the net ‡ows from the
foreign country on the outbound investment. Note that since this cash ‡ow tax is applied to net ‡ows,
then foreign tax payments are e¤ectively deducted from the tax base; following the literature, we call
such a tax a cross-border cash-‡ow tax. But, from (15),  must be equal to  for if assumption C holds.
So, we have shown:
Proposition 1. Assume green…eld investment. For national optimality, cash-‡ow taxes are required
on domestic investment i.e.  =   In addition, if there is limited managerial capacity, i.e. assumption
C holds, su¢cient conditions for national optimal acquisition and managerial capacity decisions are: (i)
the deduction rule i.e.  = (1 ¡ ¤) and (ii) allowances  = (1 ¡ ¤) These two are equivalent to a
cross-border cash-‡ow tax at rate  =   If adjustment costs are zero i.e. NC holds,  is undetermined,
and thus, exemption ( = 0) is one possible optimal rule.
The intuition for this result is simply one of targets and instruments. There are three targets; e¢cient
choice of ¤, and e¢cient domestic and foreign asset purchases. The e¢cient choice of ¤ requires
the deduction rule i.e.  = (1 ¡ ¤). Given this, the …rm can be induced to make nationally e¢cient
domestic asset purchases by setting a cash-‡ow tax at rate   and similarly, can be induced to make
nationally e¢cient domestic asset purchases by setting a cross-border cash-‡ow tax, also at rate  .
4.2.2 Acquisition Investment
Now we turn to the acquisition case. National economic welfare can again be measured by just the value
of the …rm plus domestic tax revenue, which using (7), is now:
 = ¡(1 ¡ ¢)( ¡) ¡ (1 ¡ ¢¤)(1 + ) ¤(1 ¡ ¤) (19)
+
Z 1
¢^
( + ¢ ¡)¢ ¡ () + (1 ¡ ¤)
·Z 1
¢^¤
(¤ + ¢¤ ¡)¢¤ ¡ ¤(¤)
¸
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Again, the tax system is said to be nationally optimal if the …rm’s choice of ¢^ ¢^¤ ¤ also maximizes
 The …rst-order conditions for the nationally optimal choice of ¢^ ¢^¤ are now:
¢^ = 0() (20)
¤ + ¢^¤ ¡ ¡ ¤0(¤)
 ¤
=
µ
1 ¡ ¤
1 ¡ ¤
¶
(1 + ) (21)
¤0(¤)(1 ¡ ¤) = 0() (22)
Note that the managerial e¢ciency condition is identical to that in the green…eld case. The condition for
foreign acquisitions is also identical, recalling that  ¤ = ¤ in the green…eld case.
So, our …rst conclusion from (22) is that the deduction rule i.e.  = (1 ¡ ¤) is also required, as in
the green…eld case. Second, comparing (20),(8), and recalling that  = ( ¡)(1 ¡ )(1 + ) from (2),
we see that  = 0 is required for nationally optimal domestic acquisitions. This di¤ers from the green…eld
case, where  =   because the price of the target company,  , is already e¤ectively multiplied by 1 ¡ 
because of the capitalization e¤ect. That is, there is no need for an allowance as the tax is capitalized
into the price.
Finally, comparing (21),(9), we see that again, any cross-border cash-‡ow tax at rate ,  where
 = (1 ¡ ¤) and  = (1 ¡ ¤) 0 ·  · 1 will ensure nationally optimal foreign acquisitions. We can
summarize these results as follows:
Proposition 2. Assume acquisition investment. Then, the tax rules for nationally optimal acquisition
and capacity decisions are identical to the green…eld case, with the exception that no relief on domestic
investment i.e.  = 0 is now required. That is, as long as assumption C holds the deduction rule i.e.
 = (1 ¡ ¤) and allowance  = (1 ¡ ¤) is required. Again, these are equivalent to a cross-border
cash-‡ow tax at rate  =  on foreign investment
This result is an extension of Proposition 1 of Becker and Fuest (2010) to the case where total
management capacity is not …xed ( ¤ = 1), but variable at a cost. If assumption NC applies i.e. fully
variable management capacity, then from Proposition 2, the optimal choice of  is undetermined, as in
Proposition 3 of Becker and Fuest (2010). Moreover, comparing Propositions 1 and 2 makes it clear that
there is no fundamental di¤erence between green…eld and acquisition investment. The crucial issue is
whether there is any cost of expanding managerial capacity (assumption C) or not (assumption NC)
A cross-border cash ‡ow tax at the domestic tax rate would be relatively straightforward to implement.
The home country would simply need to give relief for any outbound real investment expenditures -
whether green…eld or acquisition - and tax the corresponding real in‡ows. This is equivalent to a R-based
cash ‡ow tax on domestic investment, proposed by Meade (1978) and discussed in many subsequent
contributions.
4.3 Global Optimality
4.3.1 Green…eld Investment
We begin again with the green…eld case. The di¤erence between national and global welfare in our model
is that foreign taxes are costs from a national perspective but not from a global perspective. So, modifying
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(11), global economic welfare is measured by:
 = ¡(1 ¡ ¢)(1 + ) ¡ (1 ¡ ¢¤)(1 + )¤ (23)
+
Z 1
¢^
(¢ ¡)¢ ¡ () +
Z 1
¢^¤
(¢¤ ¡)¢¤ ¡ ¤(¤)
The …rst-order conditions for a maximum of (23) are
¢^ ¡ ¡ 0()

= 1 +  (24)
¢^¤ ¡ ¡ ¤0(¤)
¤
= 1 +  (25)
¤0(¤) = 0() (26)
First, comparing (10) and (26), we see that if assumption C holds, for globally optimal allocation of
managerial capacity, ¤ we need
1 ¡  = 1 ¡ ¤ ¡  )  =  ¡ ¤
This is the credit rule: the domestic country must give a full credit for foreign taxes paid, and then tax
the foreign income at the domestic tax rate. This is because global optimality requires the marginal
managerial unit to be taxed at the same rate at home and abroad. If assumption NC holds, of course,
no constraint is placed on  
For domestic green…eld investment, comparing (8) and (24), with  = 0, global optimality implies the
same condition as national optimality. Hence a cash ‡ow tax with  =  is optimal. This is because there
is no di¤erence in the expressions for national and global welfare with respect to domestic investment.
Since we are considering global welfare, by symmetry, the foreign country should also implement a cash
‡ow tax to ensure optimality of its own domestic investment, so that ¤ = ¤.
Finally,  = ¡¤ ¤ = ¤ is equivalent to a cross-border cash ‡ow tax at rate  = (¡¤)(1¡¤).
The key di¤erence between the requirements for national and global optimality in the case of green…eld
investment is therefore the tax rate applied to outbound investment; in the former case, it is  =  . We
therefore have shown:
Proposition 3. Assume green…eld investment. For global optimality, cash-‡ow taxes are required on
domestic investment in each country i.e.  =   ¤ = ¤ In addition, if there is limited managerial capac-
ity, (assumption C) necessary and su¢cient conditions for globally optimal acquisition and managerial
capacity decisions are: (i) the credit rule i.e.  =  ¡ ¤ and (ii) allowance  =  ¡ ¤ Conditions
(i) and (ii) are equivalent to a cross-border cash-‡ow tax at rate  = ( ¡ ¤)(1 ¡ ¤) If there is unlim-
ited management capacity (assumption NC),  is undetermined, and thus, exemption ( = 0) is one
possible optimal rule.
4.3.2 Acquisition Investment
We now turn to acquisitions investment. At the global level, the opportunity cost of the asset to the
multinational …rm is not  ¤ but forgone revenue ¤ ¡ in the second period. So, modifying (19), global
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economic welfare is measured by
 = ¡(1 ¡ ¢)( ¡ ) ¡ (1 ¡ ¢¤)(¤ ¡) (27)
+
Z 1
¢^
( + ¢ ¡ )¢ ¡ () +
Z 1
¢^¤
(¤ + ¢¤ ¡)¢¤ ¡ ¤(¤)
The …rst-order condition for a maximum of  are:
¢^ = 0() (28)
¢^¤ = ¤0(¤) (29)
¤0(¤) = 0() (30)
The …rst of these - the condition for domestic investment - is the same as the case of national optimality.
The second di¤ers from the national optimality case because tax relief in the foreign country is now
considered as a transfer with no welfare consequences; this term from (21) is not therefore present. The
third condition, for allocation of managerial capacity, is the same as that required for global optimality
of green…eld investment.
Not surprisingly, then the implications for taxes are similar. First, as (30) is the same as (26), the
credit rule is still optimal  =  ¡ ¤ as long as assumption C holds. Second, comparing (8) to (28) and
using the price formulae (2), we see that  = 0 again re‡ecting the fact that the tax is capitalized into
the price of the target …rm. By symmetry, then we also have ¤ = 0 Combining (29) with (9) indicates
that global optimality for outbound acquisitions requires
1 ¡ ¤ ¡ 
1 ¡ ¤ ¡  =
1
1 ¡ ¤
Conditional on ¤ = 0, then the condition is similar to that for national optimality, in (17). That is,
the condition is satis…ed by a cross-border cash ‡ow tax with rate (1 ¡ ¤) and allowance  = 
0 ·  · 1 However, as already remarked, the condition (30) for globally optimal allocation of managerial
capacity is that  =  ¡ ¤ if assumption C holds. Consistency between both conditions therefore
requires  = ( ¡ ¤)(1 ¡ ¤), exactly as for green…eld investment14 . We have shown the following:
Proposition 4. Assume acquisition investment. Then, the tax rules for globally optimal acquisition
and capacity decisions are identical to the green…eld case, with the exception that no relief on domestic
investment in each country i.e.  = 0 ¤ = 0 is now required. That is, as long as assumption C holds,
the credit rule i.e.  =  ¡ ¤ and an allowance  = ( ¡ ¤)(1 ¡ ¤) is required. Again, these are
equivalent to a cross-border cash-‡ow tax at rate  = ( ¡ ¤)(1 ¡ ¤) on foreign investment If there is
unlimited management capacity (assumption NC),  is undetermined, and thus, exemption ( = 0) is
one possible optimal rule.
Comparing Propositions 3 and 4 shows that the optimality rules for green…eld and acquisition invest-
ment are again very similar; the only di¤erence is that in the acquisition case, no allowance is needed for
purchase of domestic assets, as the allowance is already e¤ectively capitalized into the price. In particular,
a cross-border cash ‡ow tax system can be found which leads to optimal foreign investment in both cases.
14 However, with ¤ = 0, in this case the cash ‡ow tax cannot be applied to ‡ows gross of foreign taxes (since  6=  ).
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The implementation of such a tax would be similar to the cross-border cash ‡ow tax described above
in the context of national optimality. However, there is one important di¤erence - that the optimal
tax rate applied to cross-border cash ‡ows by the home country depends on the tax rate of the foreign
country. In a multi-country world, that would imply the rate of tax would need to depend on where the
outbound investment took place. While this would be possible in principle, it would invite …rms to route
outbound investment through a high tax country.
How are these results related to the literature? Becker and Fuest (2010) also consider a cross border
cash ‡ow system but they impose the restriction that the tax rate has to be equal to the domestic income
tax rate and …nd that this tax system is nationally but not globally optimal. In our model this would
imply  =  , which is also compatible with national optimality (see Proposition 2) but not with global
optimality (see Proposition 4). Our results also shed light on the optimality properties of the exemption
system discussed by Desai and Hines (2003).
4.4 Reconciliation with Observed Practice
Two possible concerns are that, taken literally, our model predicts (i) that countries should choose cash
‡ow taxes (or their equivalent), and (ii) that unless there are zero adjustment costs, countries should
choose either a deduction rule (if they cannot coordinate) or a credit rule (if they can), rather than
exemption.
The …rst prediction appears to be inconsistent with a generally-understood international movement
towards an expansion of de…nitions of taxable pro…t. However, recent evidence from Kawano and Slemrod
(2012) questions this interpretation. Based on information from the International Bureau of Fiscal Doc-
umentation over the period 1980 to 2004, they document 433 changes to corporation tax base de…nitions.
Of these 248 broadened the base while 195 narrowed the base. One possible explanation of the lack of
enthusiasm for cash ‡ow taxes is that the narrower tax base would require a higher tax rate to raise
equivalent revenue, and that this may worsen the problem of pro…t shifting. We model pro…t shifting
below, but we show that in our model cash ‡ow taxes are still optimal. We speculate that this may be
due to institutional constraints on tax setting - for example, due to the provisions of the OECD model
tax treaty and, for example, non-discrimination provisions in the EU. Such constraints may make it more
di¢cult for countries following a nationally optimal strategy to introduce a deduction system; without
this, then a more constrained choice may move away from cash ‡ow taxation. Below we therefore also
model the case of income taxation, where allowances are constrained to be equal to depreciation.
The second prediction appears to be inconsistent with the facts that (i) many countries choose ex-
emption, and (ii) countries that have changed their rules in recent years have tended to switch from the
credit to the exemption rule. For example, in a recent data-set based on PwC Worldwide Tax Summaries,
out of 37 high-income countries, 19 had an exemption system in 1998, rising to 27 in 200815 . None of
these countries switched from exemption to a credit or other system during this period.
However, with a small and plausible modi…cation to the model, we can explain both these facts. To
simplify the exposition, assume that the two countries can coordinate, so that the choice is between credit
and exemption, and focus on the case of green…eld investment. Note also that an exemption regime is
typically less administratively costly than a credit regime. Evidence of this, was provided, for example,
in a consultation document issued by the UK government in 2007 on whether the UK should switch
15 We thank Johannes Voget for providing us with this data-set.
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from a credit system to an exemption system. The UK government stated that “as a system of relieving
double taxation, the credit system is inevitably less straightforward for large and medium business than
dividend exemption”16 , and claimed that the proposed reforms would deliver "administrative savings for
business”.17
Normalize the administrative cost of the exemption regime to zero, and let   0 be the administrative
cost for both countries of operating a credit regime. Also, specialize the costs functions  ¤ to be
quadratic i.e.  = 2
2 ¤ = 2 (
¤)2 so the adjustment cost is fully parametrized by   0 Now let
() and () be the values of world welfare when (a) the credit or exemption regime is in place
respectively; (b) the …rm is optimizing i.e. conditions (8) ,(9), and (10) hold, and …nally (c) given (a)
and (b), allowances are chosen optimally to maximize (23). Then, the countries will jointly agree on
exemption if and only if
() ¡() · 
Now, by de…nition, ()  (), but also, by Proposition 3, () ¡() tends to zero
as  ! 0 because as  ! 0 the exemption regime is nearly as good as the credit one. Finally, ()¡
() is continuous in  This means that there is a unique ^ such that () ¡ () · 
 · ^
So, when adjustment costs are low enough, i.e.  · ^ countries will choose the exemption regime.
This allows us to explain the trend towards exemption in the context of our model. Increased globalization
means that the cost of moving mobile factors between locations has fallen i.e. falling  As  falls, a
given country is more likely to choose exemption.
5 Extensions
5.1 Pro…t-Shifting
So far we have not allowed for pro…t-shifting activity by the MNC. This is an important omission, as there
is a substantial body of evidence that multinationals use both transfer prices, and other mechanisms, such
as debt …nance, to shift pro…t between jurisdictions (e.g. Clausing, 2003). In this section, we extend
the model to allow for transfer pricing, using a speci…cation that is standard in the literature (e.g.
Hau‡er and Schjelderup, 2002). It turns out that, strikingly, for national optimality, the same tax rule
that ensures globally e¢cient allocation of managerial capacity i.e. a cross-border cash-‡ow tax at rate
 = ( ¡ ¤)(1 ¡ ¤) also eliminates the incentives to manipulate transfer prices. An analogous result
also holds for national optimality, as long as the costs of transfer pricing manipulation are tax-deductible
in some jurisdiction. So, the rules identi…ed in his paper are quite robust.
Transfer prices can be accommodated quite naturally in our framework as follows. We suppose
that the parent company, located in the home country, buys the managerial input at price  per unit,
but charges the subsidiary ¤ per unit of managerial input used. Following a substantial theoretical
literature on tax competition with transfer pricing (e.g. Hau‡er and Schjelderup, 2002, Johannesen,
2010, Becker and Fuest, 2012), we suppose that abuse of transfer pricing i.e. ¤ 6=  incurs a cost
(¤ ¡) which is increasing and convex in the deviation of the transfer price from the market price i.e.
16 HM Treasury and HMRC (2007), page 3, para 1.4.
17 HM Treasury and HMRC (2007), page 4, para 1.9.
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(0) = 0 0() 0(¡)  0  6= 0 00  0 This captures, for example, the cost of resources required to
conceal transactions from the tax authorities, or possibly, the expected cost of any …nes paid18 . In some
countries, these …nes may be substantial e.g. in the US, …nes are between 20% and 40% of tax evaded
(Eden, Valdez, & Li, 2005). However, we do not observe the subjective probability of detection, so it is
hard to meaningfully decompose  into concealment expenses and expected …nes.
The exact speci…cation of the problem facing the …rm depends on whether  is deductible from tax,
either in the home or foreign jurisdiction. The existing theoretical literature on pro…t-shifting makes
a variety of assumptions here. For example, Hau‡er and Schjelderup (2000), Johannesen (2010), and
Krautheim and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011) assume non-deductibility, whereas Swenson (2001), Huizinga
and Laeven (2008) and Becker and Fuest (2012) assume it is deductible from the parent’s tax liability.
In practice, it is reasonable that concealment expenses e.g. the employment of accountants and lawyers
would be deductible, but …nes or penalties if caught would not be. To cover all possibilities, we adopt
the most general speci…cation where fractions  ¤ of the cost  are deductible from the domestic and
foreign tax liability respectively, and 1 ¡  ¡ ¤ is not deductible anywhere.
Then we can write …rm value as
 = ¡(1 ¡ ¢^)(1 + )(1 ¡ ) ¡ (1 ¡ ¢^¤)(1 + )(1 ¡  ¡ ¤) ¤ (31)
+(1 ¡ )
·Z 1
¢^
( + ¢ ¡)¢ +
Z 1
¢^¤
(¤ ¡)¢¤ ¡ 
³
1 ¡ ¢^ ¡ +¤
´
¡ (¤ ¡)
¸
+(1 ¡ ¤ ¡  )
·Z 1
¢^¤
(¤ + ¢¤ ¡¤)¢¤ ¡ ¤(1 ¡ ¢^¤ ¡¤) ¡ ¤(¤ ¡)
¸
¡(1 ¡  ¡ ¤)(¤ ¡)
The …rm maximizes (31) with respect to ¢^ ¢^¤ and ¤ and ¤. The …rst-order conditions with respect
to the ¢^¤ continue to be (8)(10). However, (9) is modi…ed to
(1 ¡ ¤ ¡  )
³
¢^¤ ¡¤ ¡ ¤0(¤)
´
+ (1 ¡ )(¤ ¡)
 ¤
= (1 ¡  ¡ ¤)(1 + ) (32)
The …rst-order condition with respect to ¤ gives rise to an additional transfer-pricing condition
(¤ +  ¡ )(1 ¡ ¢^¤) = 0(1 ¡  ¡ (¤ +  )¤) (33)
The LHS is the overall tax avoided when ¤ is raised by one unit, and the RHS is the resource cost
of manipulating ¤ taking into account that fractions  ¤ of that cost can be deducted from tax in
either the home or foreign country. For example, in the special case where  ¤ = 0 this reduces to
0 = (¤ +  ¡ )(1 ¡ ¢^¤) i.e. the marginal cost of manipulating the transfer price is proportional to
the di¤erence in the statutory tax rates, as in Hau‡er and Schjelderup (2000).
We now turn to global optimality when ¤ is an additional choice variable. For convenience, we focus
just on the green…eld case19 . As the gains and losses from transfer pricing across countries sum to zero,
global welfare (23) is modi…ed just by subtracting (¤ ¡ ) So, at the global optimum, 0 = 0 which
18 For example, suppose that the …ne is proportional to j¤ ¡ j i.e.  j¤ ¡ j  and the probability of detection is also
proportional to j¤ ¡j i.e.  j¤ ¡j ; then the expected …ne is (¤ ¡)2
19 All results are the same in the acquisition case.
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implies that manipulation of transfer prices cannot be globally optimal i.e. global optimality requires
¤ = . But now note that if the credit rule is used,  = ¡¤ (33) reduces to 0 = 0 as required. Also
note that when  = ¤ (32) reduces to (9), and we have already established that (9) is consistent with
global optimality when the credit rule holds. To put it another way, the …rst-best can be achieved by a
cross-border cash-‡ow tax at rate  = ( ¡ ¤)(1 ¡ ¤) even with pro…t-shifting by …rms. The intuition
for this is clear: with the credit rule the …rm in e¤ect pays tax at rate  on all its pro…t worldwide - there
is therefore gain to shifting pro…t.
For completeness, we consider national optimality. With possible abuse of transfer prices, national
welfare (11) becomes
 = ¡(1 ¡ ¢)(1 + ) ¡ (1 ¡ ¢¤)(1 + )¤(1 ¡ ¤) (34)
+
Z 1
¢^
(¢ ¡)¢ +
Z 1
¢^¤
(¤ ¡)¢¤ ¡ () ¡ 
+(1 ¡ ¤)
·Z 1
¢^¤
(¢¤ ¡¤ ¡ ¤)¢¤ ¡ ¤(¤)
¸
¡ (1 ¡  ¡ ¤)
The …rst-order conditions for national optimality with respect to ¢^¤ continue to be (12), (14).
However, (13) is modi…ed to
(1 ¡ ¤)(¢^¤ ¡¤ ¡ ¤0(¤)) +¤ ¡
¤
= (1 ¡ ¤)(1 + ) (35)
Moreover, the …rst-order condition for a maximum of (34) with respect to ¤ gives rise to an additional
transfer-pricing condition which simpli…es to
¤(1 ¡ ¢^¤) = 0(1 ¡ ¤¤) (36)
The LHS is again the overall foreign tax avoided when ¤ is raised by one unit, and the RHS is the
resource cost of manipulating ¤ taking into account that fraction ¤ of that cost can be deducted from
tax in the foreign country.
Comparing (33) and (36), then as long as  + ¤ = 1 i.e. that all resources used to transfer price
are deductible from tax somewhere, the deduction rule  = (1 ¡ ¤) delivers national optimality,
conditional on ¢^¤ being optimal. Moreover, comparing (32), (35), we see that these two are equivalent if
 = (1 ¡ ¤)  = (1 ¡ ¤) But, as argued in Proposition 1 above, these two conditions are in turn
equivalent to a cross-border cash-‡ow tax at rate at rate  =  .
So, we can summarize our results as follows:
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Proposition 5. Assume that manipulation of the transfer price is possible. Then:
(i) For global optimality, cash-‡ow taxes are required on domestic investment in each country i.e.
 =  ¤ = ¤ In addition, whether or not there is limited managerial capacity, necessary and su¢cient
conditions for globally optimal acquisition, managerial capacity and transfer pricing decisions are a cross-
border cash-‡ow tax at rate  = ( ¡ ¤)(1 ¡ ¤)
(ii) For national optimality, cash-‡ow taxes are required on domestic investment i.e.  =   In addition,
if the costs of transfer pricing are tax-deductible in some jurisdiction i.e. +¤ = 1 then, whether or not
there is limited managerial capacity, necessary and su¢cient conditions for globally optimal acquisition,
managerial capacity and transfer pricing decisions are a cross-border cash-‡ow tax at rate  =  
Note …nally that national optimality cannot generally be achieved if  + ¤  1 If  = ¤ = 0 for
example, as in Hau‡er-Schjelderup (2000), then from (36), national optimality requires 0 = ¤(1¡ ¢^¤)
From (33), the …rm can be induced to follow this rule only if  =   which is not consistent with the
deduction rule  = (1 ¡ ¤). In this case, there is a genuine "second-best" tax design problem20 .
Proposition 5 relates to the existing literature as follows. Most theoretical papers on corporate pro…t
shifting assume that foreign source income is exempt from domestic taxation. The focus of these papers
is usually on how pro…t shifting a¤ects nationally optimal corporate tax policy (Hau‡er and Schjelderup
(2000)) or on the role of anti tax avoidance policies (Peralta et al (2006), Becker and Fuest (2012)).
There are empirical studies, though, which investigate the role of taxes on foreign source income for
pro…t shifting and …nd that countries which tax exempt foreign pro…ts from domestic taxation are more
vulnerable to pro…t shifting than countries with tax credit systems (Markle (2012), Ma¢ni (2012)), which
is in line with the result in proposition 5.
5.2 An Income Tax
We now consider the case in which each country levies a tax on the full income of the …rm. We de…ne
this to be a tax on the total income of the …rm after deducting costs other than …nancing costs. In e¤ect,
this …xes the rate of allowance. This leaves only the tax rates as instruments that can be set by each
government. We assume full relief is available for the cost of depreciation, but no relief is available for
the cost, or opportunity cost, of …nance. In the context of a two period model, the asset has no value at
the end of period 2, and hence the rate of depreciation in that period is 100%. This generates tax relief
in period 2 of  in the home country and ¤ in the foreign country. Assume that the tax on outbound
investment receives a depreciation allowance worth  =  . Note that these depreciation allowances are
equivalent to …xing the values of the initial allowance as  = (1+); ¤ = ¤(1+) and  = (1+).
So, plugging these values for the allowances into the …rm’s …rst-order conditions (8),(9), we get
 + ¢^ ¡ ¡ 0()

=
1 +  ¡ 
1 ¡  (37)
¤ + ¢^¤ ¡ ¡ ¤0(¤)
 ¤
=
1 +  ¡ ¤ ¡ 
1 ¡ ¤ ¡  (38)
20 This problem could be stated as: given  ¤ …nd  ¤  to maximize national or global welfare, given the induced
behavior of the …rm. This is a di¢cult problem to solve, and is beyond the scope of this paper. We conjecture that the
second-best optimal tax  will be somewhere between  and (1¡ ¤) and it will depend on the degree of responsiveness
of transfer pricing to the tax di¤erential (¤+  ¡ ), and the degree of responsiveness of the allocation of  ¤ to the tax
wedge (1¡ ¤ ¡  )(1¡ )
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The …rm’s …rst order condition for the allocation of management capacity is unchanged because the
costs associated remain fully deductible. Obviously, conditions for national and global optimality are
unchanged and are given by equations (12) - (14) and (24)-(26) respectively for green…eld investment,
and (20) - (22) and (28)-(30) respectively for acquisitions investment.
It is now clear that with an income tax, it is not possible to achieve a national or global …rst-best.
First, comparing (37) with the conditions for national and global optimality of domestic investment,
it is clear that the cost of capital under an income tax (the RHS of (37)) exceeds the cost of capital
under the optimality conditions. Consequently, for any positive tax rate, there will be under-investment
domestically by the MNC. Second, comparing (38) with the condition of global optimality also indicates
that, for any positive tax rate in the foreign country, there will be under-investment relative to the global
optimum. A su¢cient condition for the national optimum is an exemption system:  = 0. But, if
adjustment costs are positive, i.e. condition C holds, national optimality requires  = (1 ¡ ¤), and
both cannot hold generally
So, we now investigate the second-best setting of  via a mixture of analytical results and sim-
ulations. First, without much loss of generality, we assume that adjustment costs are quadratic i.e.
() = 22 ¤(¤) = ¤(¤)22 We will also focus on the green…eld case and global optimality.
Then, the model parameters are (   ¤  ¤ ¤) First, note that if the are no adjustment costs
( = ¤ = 0) then we see, comparing (24),(25) and (37), (38) that (i) generally, the equilibrium cuto¤
¢^ is too high, but cannot be altered by choice of  ; (ii) ¢^¤ is too high, but can be brought down to the
…rst-best level by setting  = ¡¤ i.e. by giving a subsidy on foreign investment income, a rule even
more generous than exemption.
What happens when adjustment costs are strictly positive? The previous argument still applies, but
now any deviation from the credit rule will cause an ine¢cient allocation of management capacity between
home and foreign subsidiaries. So, we would expect that these two forces would lead to an optimal 
generally lower than the credit rule, but somewhere above exemption if adjustment costs are important
enough. It turns out that we can establish this, or at least the …rst part, in the case of symmetric
investments. We will say that the home and foreign investment opportunities are symmetric if the set up
and adjustment costs are the same ( = ¤  = ¤) Then, we have the following result, proved in the
Appendix:
Proposition 6. With green…eld investment, and with an income tax, the second-best globally optimal
 is equal to the credit rule plus an adjustment factor i.e.
 =  ¡ ¤ + (1 ¡ ) (39)
where
 =
1
¤¤ ¤
Ã

1 ¡  
¢^

+
(¤ +  )
1 ¡ (¤ +  )
¤ ¢^
¤

!
(40)
In particular, if home and foreign investment opportunities are symmetric, then   0 at  =  ¡ ¤
and so the second-best optimal  is below the credit rule
In (40), ¢^

etc. denote the equilibrium responses of ¢^ ¢^¤¤ to changes  via (37), (38) and (10),
with  =   The intuition for the result is the following. Consider a small cut in  at  = ¡¤ This
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cut will have two e¤ects. First, it will tend to increase ¤ foreign managerial capacity. But, because
the credit rule is initially in place, the initial allocation of managerial capacity between home and foreign
subsidiaries is e¢cient and so this e¤ect has no …rst order e¤ect on welfare. Second, it will a¤ect ¢^ ¢^¤
raising the former and lowering the latter However, it can be shown that the cut increases the number of
projects undertaken in the aggregate (i.e. lowers ¢^+¢^¤) which has a …rst-order positive e¤ect on global
welfare, as the cost of capital is initially too high both domestically and abroad under an income tax.
The following simulations illustrate this result21 . Figure 1 graphs the optimal  i.e. the value of 
that maximizes  subject to constraints (37), (38) and (10). For both  = 05 01  lies below
 ¡ ¤ One might also expect that the lower  the lower is   as in this case, the e¢ciency loss from
cutting it (in terms of the misallocation of managerial capacity) is lower. This is indeed what we see.
Figure 1
Figure shows the optimal  varying  for a …xed ¤=0.2.
Other parameters are  = ¤= 03
In practice, of course,  is not optimized, but set equal to exemption or credit. So, it is also of interest
to ask; for what parameter con…gurations is credit or exemption the better choice? Figures 2(a),(b) shed
some light on this: the shaded area indicates pairs (  ¤) for which credit gives a higher global welfare
than exemption. To interpret these …gures, note two things. First, the allocation of management capacity
is distorted under the exemption system but not under the credit system. Second, the choice between
21 For all simulations, we assume  = 0 0 = 0  = 01  = ¤ Other parameter values are indicated in the notes to
the …gures.
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exemption and credit system a¤ects the distortion of the foreign investment decision depends on whether
the home tax is higher or lower than the foreign tax.
Figure 2(a):  = 05 ¤ = 03
Credit weakly dominates exemption in the shaded area.
Figure 2(b):  = 01 ¤ = 03
Credit weakly dominates exemption in the shaded area.
Whenever the home tax is lower, a switch from exemption to credit will reduce both distortions,
because it will lower the tax on foreign-source income, and move the foreign project cost ¤ 1+¡
¤¡
1¡¤¡
closer to ¤(1+) As a result, if   ¤, credit dominates exemption in terms of global welfare. But when
the home tax is higher, things are less clear-cut. Moving from the exemption to the credit system still
removes the distortion of management capacity. However, the distortion of foreign investment increases.
Therefore exemption can be better than credit in this case, as can be seen in Figures 2(a),(b). Moreover,
exemption is more likely to dominate the smaller the parameter  since a small  implies that the
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distortion of management capacity caused by the exemption system is relatively unimportant. This is
illustrated by the comparison between Figures 2(a) and (b), where  is smaller in case (b).
Finally, the question arises as to whether Proposition 6 requires the assumption of symmetry. In fact,
it is required: Figure 3 shows that when the foreign investment projects are relatively less costly than the
home ones (¤  ) it is possible that    ¡¤ i.e.  exceeds the credit rule. This is consistent with
formula (40): when ¤ is small, the …rst term in  dominates, and this will be positive as an increase in
 both lowers foreign management capacity ( 
¤

 0) and increases the number of domestic projects³
¢^

 0
´
 In turn, if  is positive, this implies    ¡ ¤
Figure 3
Figure shows the optimal  varying  for a …xed ¤=0.2.
Other parameters are:  = 05
5.3 Other Extensions
5.3.1 Endogenous Factor Prices
So far we have assumed that the interest rate  and the price of internationally mobile managers 
are given exogenously. Assuming that prices of internationally mobile factors are …xed is a standard
assumption in the analysis of tax policy in small open economies. This assumption is appropriate for
the analysis of national optimality but problematic when it comes to analyzing global optimality. In a
previous version of this paper (Devereux et. al., 2013), we endogenize  and 
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This is done following Becker and Fuest (2010), by assuming that households in both countries save,
generating a supply of capital, and also supply labour, interpreted as management services. In this
setting, changes in ¢^, ¢^¤¤ cause  and  to change, generating "terms of trade" e¤ects. These e¤ects
wash out when global welfare is considered, so Propositions 3 and 4 continue to hold when  and  are
endogenized. However, things are di¤erent in the case of national optimality if individual countries have a
signi…cant impact on these factor prices. In this case the optimal tax policy depends on whether countries
are net importers or exporters of capital and management services. The fact that countries may be able
to exploit market power in international markets has been studied extensively in the literature22 , so that
we do not discuss this issue further here.
5.3.2 Deferral
In practice, most tax systems only tax foreign income when it is repatriated, rather than when it accrues
abroad (and when the foreign tax is paid). To analyze how this a¤ects the results in this paper, assume
that the foreign subsidiary has retained earnings after foreign tax from previous periods denoted by ¤.
Out of this, it uses ¤ to …nance its foreign investment earning pro…ts of ¦¤ the following period. Since
this does not involve any ‡ow from the home country, we assume that for this investment  = 0. The
remainder, ¤ ¡¤ is repatriated, facing additional tax at rate  due on the grossed up pro…t so that
the parent company receives (1 ¡ ¤ ¡  )(¤ ¡¤)((1 ¡ ¤). As before, the …rm maximizes the value
of second-period after-tax cash-‡ow minus new equity, i.e.
~ = ¡ ¡ (¤ ¡¤)(1 ¡ 
¤ ¡  )
(1 ¡ ¤) +
(1 ¡ )¦ + (1 ¡ ¤ ¡  )¦¤
1 + 
(41)
where  is taken as exogenous. Using (4), (5) and (6), we see that the formula for the value of the …rm,
(7), continues to hold except that the e¤ective cost of foreign investment falls from (1 + )(1 ¡ ¤)¤ to
(1+)(1¡¤) ¤ (1¡¤¡ )(1¡¤)  This implies that the …rm’s …rst-order conditions for ¢^ and ¤ are una¤ected
by deferral, but that the condition for  ¢^¤ becomes:
¤ + ¢^¤ ¡ ¡ ¤0(¤)
 ¤
=
(1 ¡ ¤)
(1 ¡ ¤) (1 + ) (42)
The cost of capital on the RHS of (42) is independent of  . This is e¤ectively just an application of the
"new view" of dividend taxation: investment …nanced by retained earnings is independent of the tax due
on dividends as long as the dividend tax rate is not expected to change, and was pointed out by Hartman
(1985). This is because the investment receives tax relief at the same rate as the subsequent return is
taxed, as in a cash ‡ow tax.
The …rst order condition (42) is identical to the condition for national optimality, since the domestic
tax does not a¤ect the size of outbound investment. Hence, outbound investment …nanced by retained
earnings abroad is automatically nationally optimal. Global optimality requires a cash ‡ow tax abroad
to ensure no distortion to investment decisions; that is, it requires ¤ = ¤.
22 For surveys of the literature on setting of source-based capital taxes with an endogenous interest rate, see Hau‡er
(2001).
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5.3.3 Competition between Acquirers
So far, we have assumed that the home MNC can extract all the surplus from the seller when making an
acquisition. However, as stressed by Desai and Hines (2003), there may be several international investors
competing for a single product. Assume now that there is a potential acquirer located in the foreign
country (the foreign acquirer, FA) who can produce an additional amount (¢¤) from the target ¢¤
…rm. The FA could be located in a third country without changing the results, at the cost of additional
notation. Now, suppose that the price for the target is set competitively i.e. the …rm with the largest
reservation price buys it and pays the price that the other …rm is willing to pay, if that exceeds the
reservation price of the seller, (¤ ¡ )(1 + ). This will be the outcome of any auction, for example
(Dutch, English, …rst-price, second-price) conducted by the seller - see e.g. Krishna (2009).
The …rst point to note is that because the national government takes  ¤ as given, the conditions for
national optimality are una¤ected. Thus, Proposition 2 continues to hold. However, this is not true for
global optimality; now, the global real opportunity cost allowing the MNC to own the …rm ¢¤ located
in the foreign country is (¤ ¡+maxf(¢¤) 0g Nevertheless, we can show that Proposition 4 extends
to this case (Devereux et. al., 2013).
The key to this extension is that the price of the asset is set competitively. If the seller can extract
some of the surplus from the MNC when there is no other potential buyer, a kind of "hold-up" problem
is created; from a global point of view, the asset is too expensive for the MNC buyer, and so acquisitions
will be ine¢ciently low under cross-border cash-‡ow taxation. This point is also made in Section 3.3 of
Becker and Fuest (2010), and so we do not investigate it formally here. From a national perspective,
conditional on the foreign acquisition taking place, then a higher  reduces the price the acquirer is
willing to pay, implying that the additional tax is exported to the foreign seller.23
5.3.4 Spillovers
So far, we have ignored positive spillovers - demonstration e¤ects, increased competition, worker training,
exports etc. - for residents of the host country from FDI. However, the FDI literature emphasizes that
they can be very signi…cant. Since such spillovers are often cited as being one of the main reasons
countries want to attract MNC investment, this is an important omission.. Furthermore - although there
is much less evidence on this - there may be di¤erences in spillovers between green…eld and acquisition24 .
One way to internalize these positive spillovers is for the host country to explicitly subsidize investment
(see e.g. P‡üger and Südekum, 2012). However, such explicit subsides may not always be possible (for
example, they may not be consistent with EU state aid rules).
Note that the rules derived above for national optimality are una¤ected by spillovers, given that they
accrue entirely to foreign residents. We therefore focus on global optimality. Here, we brie‡y show that,
even in the absence of such explicit subsidies, there is su¢cient ‡exibility in the tax system to achieve
global optimality when spillovers are present.
The natural way to introduce spillovers to this setting is to suppose that the there is some external
bene…t, (1¡¤(¢^¤)) to foreign residents from the total volume of investment 1¡¤(¢^¤) in the foreign
23 See our earlier working paper, Devereux et. al. (2013) for a formal treatment.
24 The di¤erent spillover channels of FDI identi…ed in the literature (demonstration, increased competition, worker training,
backward and forward linkages,exports), do not typically distinguish between the two modes of FDI (e.g. Crespo and
Fontura, 2007). The only empirical evidence that we are aware of that allows for di¤erent e¤ects of the two modes is a
study of the Czech Republic (Stancik, 2010).
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country. This could di¤er between green…eld and acquisition investment, in which case we denote the
external bene…t as  and . Consider the green…eld case …rst. Adding this term to (23), we see that
(25) is modi…ed to
0 + ¢^
¤ ¡ ¡ ¤0(¤)
¤
= 1 +  (43)
Now set  =  ¡ ¤ to ensure e¢cient allocation of managerial capacity, and, from Proposition 3, let
¤ = ¤  =  ¡ ¤ +  in the condition (9) determining the …rm’s foreign investment. This gives
¢^¤ ¡ ¡ ¤0(¤)
¤
=
(1 ¡  ¡ )
(1 ¡ ) (1 + ) (44)
Comparing (43),(44), it is then easily seen that in the green…eld case, the …rm can be induced to internalize
the investment spillover if  =
0(1¡)
¤(1+)  A similar argument in the acquisition case shows that the
required additional allowance is  =
0(1¡)
¤(1+)  So, when allowances can be optimized, there is enough
‡exibility in the tax system to internalize spillovers. But, this does require a deviation from cross-border
cash-‡ow taxation, in the direction of subsidizing outward investment.
6 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the national and global optimality of taxes on foreign source income of multi-
national …rms. We start from the observation that the recent literature on the taxation of foreign pro…ts
makes di¤erent assumptions regarding the corporate tax system under consideration, the impact of foreign
investment on domestic economic activity and the type of foreign investment - investment in immobile
assets and investment in mobile capital. The main …nding of the analysis is that the standard results
regarding the optimal taxation of foreign source income - the national optimality of the full taxation
after deduction system and the global optimality of the tax credit system - also hold in a model that
combines investment in immobile assets and mobile capital, provided that two conditions hold. Firstly,
the corporate tax is a cash ‡ow tax, with full deductibility of all capital expenses. Secondly, more foreign
investment reduces domestic investment.
If the second condition does not hold and domestic investment does not decline as a result of more
foreign investment, the exemption system leads to optimality, but any other tax on foreign source income
(provided it is not con…scatory) does so as well. If the …rst condition does not hold because either
acquisition expenses or capital costs for green…eld investment are not fully deductible, the optimal tax
on foreign source income changes. In some cases, none of the standard regimes lead to either national or
global optimality.
Our approach has been to consider the optimal taxation of foreign source income in a traditional
setting in which the residence of the investor is immobile and in which the costs of administering a tax on
foreign source income are not too high. Relaxing either of these conditions could create a situation which
makes the exemption more favorable. However, if the mobility of all elements of a multinational company
are high enough, then neither residence- nor conventional source-based taxation may be optimal, even
under a cash ‡ow tax. In such circumstances, the optimal approach may be to levy a tax on income on
a destination basis, that is in the location of sales which are likely to be less mobile.25
25 For an analysis of a destination-based tax, see Auerbach and Devereux (2013).
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A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 6
(i) Di¤erentiating  in (23) with respect to   bearing in mind that ¢^ ¢^¤¤ depend on   and
using ¤ = ¤(1 + )we obtain


= ¡
³
¢^ ¡ ¡ 0() ¡ (1 + )
´ ¢^

¡
³
¢^¤ ¡ ¡ ¤0(¤) ¡ (1 + )¤
´ ¢^¤

+(¤0(¤) ¡ 0()) 
¤

(45)
Using (37) and (38), this can be re-expressed as


= ¡ 
1 ¡  
¢^

¡ (
¤ +  )
1 ¡ (¤ +  )
¤ ¢^
¤

+
µ
1 ¡ 1 ¡ 
¤ ¡ 
1 ¡ 
¶
¤0(¤)
¤

(46)
Setting (46) equal to zero and rearranging, we get (39),(40) as required.
(ii) Now evaluate (40) in the symmetric case i.e. where i.e.  = ¤  = ¤ also imposing the credit
rule  =  ¡ ¤ We get
 =
1
¤¤ ¤


1 ¡  
Ã
¢^

+
¢^¤

!
(47)
We now show that
¤

 0
¢^

+
¢^¤

 0 (48)
Then, it follows from (40) that   0 and so from (39) that    ¡ ¤ as required.
(iii) From (37), (38) and (10), using  =   and the the assumption of quadratic  we can write the
…rst-order conditions for the …rm’s choices as:
 + ¢^ ¡ ¡  =
µ
1 +  ¡ 
1 ¡ 
¶
 (49)
¤ + ¢^¤ ¡ ¡ ¤¤ =
µ
1 +  ¡ ¤ ¡ 
1 ¡ ¤ ¡ 
¶
¤ (50)
(1 ¡ ) ¡ ¤¤(1 ¡ ¤ ¡  ) = 0 (51)
Totally di¤erentiating this system, imposing symmetry i.e.  = ¤  = ¤ and  =  ¡ ¤ and
recalling that  ¤ depend on ¢^ ¢^¤¤ via (3), we get:0B@ 1 +  0 ¡0 1 +  
(1 ¡ ) ¡(1 ¡ ) ¡2(1 ¡ )
1CA
0B@ ¢^¢^¤
¤
1CA =
0B@ 0¤(1¡¤¡ )2
¤
1CA (52)
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Then, from Cramer’s rule, we get

¢^

=
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ 0 0 ¡ 1 +  
¤ ¡(1 ¡ ) ¡2(1 ¡ )
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ = 2(1 ¡ ) + 2(1 + )¤

¢^¤

=
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ 1 +  0 ¡0  
(1 ¡ ) ¤ ¡2(1 ¡ )
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ = ¡2(1 ¡ ) ¡ 2(1 + )¤ ¡ 2(1 + )(1 ¡ )

¤

=
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ 1 +  0 00 1 +  
(1 ¡ ) ¡(1 ¡ ) ¤
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ = (1 + )2¤ + (1 + )(1 ¡ )  0
where  = 
(1¡¤¡ )2  and where  is the determinant of the Jacobian of the system (52), and   0
from the second-order conditions to the …rm’s problem. So, 
¤

 0 as required. Moreover, it is then
easily checked that

Ã
¢^

+
¢^¤

!
= ¡2(1 + )(1 ¡ )  0
implying that ¢^ +
¢^¤
  0 as required. ¤
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